Mokka is a PC (CAP theorem) consensus algorithm for handling replicated logs in open networks. This algorithm has some common approaches nested from RAFT, but its nature and design make Mokka a better solution in the following cases: the ability to maintain durable consistency over sensitive historical data, ability to work in the trustless environment, ability to append logs from all nodes in the cluster. To make it possible to work in a trustless environment, mokka use cryptography algorithms for data validation and voting handling. The data storage is maintained through the Merkle tree, which makes it impossible to erase/rewrite part of the logs and achieve any inconsistent state. The logs, proposed from the followers, are handled thanks to gossip protocol, which brings a better approach to avoiding losing logs during a node failure.
impact on the speed of appending new logs or can spoil the voting process (in case voting has a timeout). Furthermore, in single leader-based consensus engines, the follower nodes usually have a passive behavior, which means, that logs are appending and detection of missed logs -is becoming the leader problem. So, achieving the higher speed should lead to some optimizations regarding logs appending, or just to switching to PA from PC.
Another problem (which is related to CP algorithms) lies in keeping a strong history. Most other consensus engines use timestamp and index, to detect the order of logs. However, according to this approach, the history of logs may become inconsistent, as there is no relation between the previous log and the current one, except the number. This can lead to partial history rewriting during leader change (when a new leader has a lower history than the previous one), or during the split and merge of the network.
Mokka aims to solve most of the described problems above by introducing some novel features: 1) Safe log append: Mokka uses HMAC root hash + index to handle the history of replicated logs 2) Secured voting: the voting process happens with double validation. The first validation includes checking that the current vote is still active and has been started by the legal node. The second validation happens during voting and includes checking that right node voted for the current round. 3) Secured log appending: each write request includes the voting signature, to validate that log has been committed by the leader in this round (i.e., term). 4) Pending logs: each node can promote logs, which will be shared across all members and stay in mempool until the leader commits them.
Nodes

About
Node, regarding consensus algorithm, is a peer or network's member who is responsible for maintaining the global state machine and local RSM. The RSM accept new changes in a structure called "log". Based on the role of the node, it can promote, commit, or append the logs to its state.
RSM
The RSM is a part of the consensus, which is responsible for forming the local state of the node, and the global state of the system. The RSM model in Mokka is strict. However, pending logs may be delivered in a different order. However, this affects only the leader node. Followers receive committed logs in the same order, as they were applied on the leader's side. As a result, the local and global state should be equal. The reason why changes are delivered in a random order is based on the chosen pattern of working with pending changes.
Node's representation in the network
Mokka uses the extended representation of addressing. This includes the combination of protocol, address, and public key. Therefore, during boot, each node has a list of known peers, its address, and the public key.
As each action, which can change system state (i.e., log appending and voting), should be validated, mokka use asymmetric cryptography, to sign each action. This helps followers to make sure, that specific packet has been signed by a known peer, and help the leader to make sure, that vote has been received from the right node.
Roles
Mokka has completely the same roles as RAFT, but their rights may differ: 1) Leader: the leader node can propose and commit new logs. However, the leader sometimes not able to track the current follower's state. So for that reason, in case of follower receive ACK message from the leader, where follower's log is less than the current one, follower sends back the APPEND_ACK message so that the leader could update its state. 2) Follower: the follower can propose logs to the leader (via gossip protocol). Also, the follower can start the voting process (In this case the node's state changes to the candidate) 3) Candidate: the candidate can handle the voting process, collect new votes and build a special "proof," which is used during log appending process (to ensure, that this node is a leader and can commit the specific log). Once the candidate receives enough positive votes -it becomes the leader and starts committing new logs. Otherwise, the candidate changes its state to the follower.
Heartbeat
The heartbeat process is the process for monitoring the state of specific node/nodes. In some RSM algorithms, like PAXOS or RAFT, this approach is used for monitoring the leader node. So, other members of the network became aware that the current leader is down and started voting for choosing a new leader.
The heartbeat may be active and passive. In the first case, the heartbeat signal is sent from the follower node to the leader node, to obtain the state. In the second case -the opposite happens, and the leader sends the signal to all followers in the network.
Mokka has taken the RAFT approach and chosen the behavior when the leader sends his heartbeat state to the followers. However, besides just tracking the state, mokka also use the heartbeat for synchronization purpose (section 4.3).
Voting
About
The voting process is a kind of action, which helps members in the network to decide which node will do a certain action (i.e., state mutation). In the case with Mokka and some other RSM algorithms as RAFT, the voting helps to choose the leader node. This process also helps to reach the consensus by giving the right to commit new logs to the valid node. There is no general rule for the voting process; however, in most RSM algorithms, to apply any change, you have to reach the quorum (i.e., 51% of votes).
Voting process
During the vote, the candidate generates the Shamir's secret (SSSS) (section 4.2), where the amount of pieces is equal to the number of nodes in the network. The secret is generated by the current timestamp and term. Then these parts are going to be sorted, and all parts, except the last one, are sent to the follower nodes. The last piece -is the leader piece.
When the follower receives the vote signal with his shared secret part, it validates that candidate may become the leader. This may happen in the following cases:
1) Candidate has the same history (which can be validated by Merkle root) 2) Candidate's term is higher than the last known term
After the follower went through the rules (described above), he may send the reply. In case all rules are valid, then the follower will sign his payload (i.e., part of the secret) with his private key and send back the status of reply and signature. Otherwise, the node will send only vote status without a signature.
During the voting process, we wait until a timeout happens, or we reach the minimum quorum for changing leader. After quorum is reached, the leader node prepares the proof. The proof includes the amount of quorum, signatures of each node (the signature of part of a secret) and timestamp (start vote time). This proof is then used by the leader for committing purpose during the current round (i.e., term).
Voting types
In previous topics, we've described the voting as the process to reach the consensus and take the right ownership to a valid node. But, we haven't mentioned when the voting happens.
In mokka, like in RAFT, the voting happens, when current leader stopped sending the heartbeat. Also, the leader may start revoting, in case the proof token became outdated. However, the general strategy for making voting, and all related issues (like concurrent voting), are nested from RAFT as well.
Security and cryptography
About
The security part of mokka represents a set of rules devoted to protecting the system from malicious behavior, like fake voting or appending wrong history or logs. As a result, the security aspect touch all actions, which change the system state (i.e., voting and appending). The basic rule for all actions is that they shouldn't be anonymous. For this purpose, mokka use the asymmetric cryptography and sign each action. Based on the signature mokka can restore the public key and validate the peer, who sent certain commit/vote/ do any other kind of action.
Beside asymmetric cryptography, mokka also use the properties of SSS scheme for voting and validation purpose. This validation helps safely commit, because:
1) The leader commits in a round, where each round is validated through the proof.
2) Each commit is signed with the node's public key, which made the commit
Generating Shamir's secret
The Shamir's secret sharing is a cryptography algorithm, which allows sharing secret by dividing it into parts and giving each member his unique part of the encrypted secret. The idea of this algorithm is in the restoration of the secret. According to this algorithm, you can create an N amount of shares, but to restore the secret, you only need M shares (for instance 3 of 5).
The key idea of the algorithm is to turn the secret into a point on the graph and come up with the polynomial function, with k-1 degree. The arguments of the polynomial function are other randomly chosen points, whose combination (like 3 of 5) and applying over this polynomial function will return our original secret. Another interesting thing about the SSSS scheme is that each share will be, at least, the same size as the original secret. That means that it is harder to steal the secret even if you know half of the required shares to reconstruct it.
In mokka, the SSSS algorithm is used for handling the voting process. During voting, each follower node receives its part of a generated secret (which holds the candidate). The algorithm generates the secret by current timestamp + term, with an option of possible restoration only if 51% or more of all shares are present. So, in case we have five nodes in the network, and one becomes the candidate, we need at least three shares from 3 nodes (floor (5 / 2) + 1) for restoring the secret. In case, some of the nodes will try to send a fake part, the Shamir's algorithm will not be able to restore the secret, and voting will fail.
This a common scenario during the network delays. For instance, some of the members in the network will try to send their vote, while the round has been over and a new one has started. So, it serves not only for security reason but also as a good collision resolver.
Proof generation and validation
As we've mentioned earlier, after the voting process has been over, and other members of network voted for the candidate, the candidate has to build the proof, which he will use on every append command.
The proof represents itself a combination of signatures (received from nodes, who voted), shares, term, and timestamp (when voting started). This proof is a non-static size and depends on the number of nodes in the network (i.e., quorum). So, in the case of a quorum is equal to 3, then the proof will contain three signatures + 3 shares + term + timestamp.
When the follower receives the append command, it makes the certain validations against the proof, to make sure, that log has been received and committed by a valid leader. The validation process looks like so:
1) The follower checks all signatures: by knowing the signature and original signed data, we can restore the public key. The restored public key we then compare with known public keys. In case we meet some unknown public key -the validation fails 2) We obtain the secret from shares (which is timestamp + term) and compare it against leader term + restored timestamp Also, each proof token may have the expiration period. This means that after a certain token expires, the leader should ask about revoting; otherwise, another follower will become the candidate.
Signing and signature validation
The signing process is not trivial, as well. This includes the signing process of the required payload (in our case -the Shamir's share), recovering the public key and validation of sent share by signature. For this purpose, Mokka uses the ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) family algorithm with secp256k1 curve.
In common, Mokka uses ECDH for validating all actions, which can lead to changing state or state machine (voting, log appending). To do that, the node signs the information which it wants to propose, and other members in the network validate this information. As a result, each node has its key pairpublic and private. The private key is used for signing, while the public key is used for the validation purpose.
After the certain data has been signed, the signer node sends this data alongside with original data. Thanks to curve properties, we can restore the public key by knowing only signature and original data. This process is also called "public key recover." The main trick here is that the recovered key should be equal to the public key of the node, who signed this payload.
Logs
About
The log -is a structure, which keeps certain change made in RSM. The chain of logs produces the current state of the system. In most consensus algorithms (except some K-V and PA based), each log has a unique identifier. In Raft and Paxos it is index. In Mokka it is so-called "root hash" (5.6) and a hash of the current log.
Appending logs
The logs can be committed only by the leader. The leader is responsible for replicating this log to all followers. Follower should validate the log and leader's origin: so follower will check the proof token (4.3) and signature of log (which should be the leader's signature). In case all is fine, then the follower node accepts the log from this leader.
Handling missed logs/acks
The append logs flow in mokka close to the concept in RAFT. However, Mokka brings some significant differences to RAFT strategy: in Raft, the leader is aware of each follower's state (as it relies on saved history and saved acks). Mokka doesn't store ack per each log. Instead, during sync/voting process, when the leader/candidate receives the reply from the follower, it remembers its state to memory. Once the leader becomes follower, this information can be safely wiped (as appending and control is completely on the leader's side).
Follower commit
The main advantage of mokka is an ability to propose new logs to the leader from every node in the cluster. This happens thanks to gossip protocol. The main concept is that every node sends a log to the temp pool of logs (i.e., pending logs) and replicate them between all node in the cluster. Once the leader receives the pending log, it commits this log and sends to all nodes in the cluster. Once the follower receives the certain log, it checks the log's hash against hashes of logs in temp pool. In case it found the log in the temp pool, then follower pulls this log from the temp pool. However, the leader has another rule: it doesn't send any logs to temp pool but append it and send to other nodes directly.
This approach with gossip protocol allows not only publish logs without delay, but also it solves the problem with follower's/leader's failures:
1) in case the follower falls, another follower will have its pending logs, and maintain them until the leader will append them. 2) In case the leader fails, another follower may become the leader and append those logs.
Counters
A counter is an index of replicated logs. Usually, this number represents the current height of applied logs; however, in different cases, this number may also serve as a counter for all changes made to RSM. This depends on implementation. For instance, in operation based consensus protocols, each change to RSM is applied through the transaction, which means that the counter represents the number of applied transactions. Also, the counter can be increment-only or not: this depends on rollback strategy (for instance, when we have eventual consistency, and system want to merge deltas).
The algorithms, like RAFT and Paxos, rely on the counter as on the only value, which describes the current state. Actually, in ideal isolated systems, this may be fine, but in case, someone will change RSM state and change the internal logs or will send fake logs to the follower, the system won't be able to detect such issue, and there can be different final RSM state.
Mokka resolves this issue by adding an extra parameter for controlling the current state of RSMcontrol hash.
5.5
Log's history
The history of logs is represented as the sequence of applied changes to RSM, following one by one. This structure allows us to make sure that logs were appended in the right order (by sequence number).
To avoid collisions and history rewriting, Mokka use root hash. The root hash is the computed HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) with SHA-256 as a hash function, composed of all hashes, applied before. So, the basic rule looks like so:
So, the HMAC hash is built up from hashes from all logs, applied in sequence order. During each append, the hash is calculated on the node locally. The calculation includes hashing of log and appending this hash to the current root hash, which produces the new root hash. This root hash is compared with hash, which we've received from leader node alongside with log. In case the root hash on the follower node and root hash on the leader node are not the same, then the log will not be appended; otherwise, we append the log from the leader.
Such an approach can help to solve the issue, happened to most current consensus algorithms, related to history merging. For instance, RAFT uses the index of the log as the main identifier for the log. In this case, let's imagine that our network has been suddenly split into two parts. In the first network, the nodes committed 120 records, while in the second network the nodes committed 200 records. All this happens under the same term. Now, we merge the network back. According to RAFT, the leader node will be selected the node with a larger amount of logs (i.e., by index). In this case, only 80 logs will be treated as missed and appended. However, previous 120 logs may be completely different in two or more nodes in the cluster.
This fine, when logs contain only some meta info, but it's not the right behavior when you try to run some expert system, which makes a conclusion based on previous input.
Challenges in design
The RSM protocols are designed according to certain needs, in order to solve certain challenges. These kinds of challenges may be scale factor, performance, timing, fault tolerance, and logs order.
Scale factor
The scale factor is the main problem for single or multileader RSM systems, which use the CP properties of CAP theorem. The issue comes to latency: as more nodes connect to the network, more requests have to be performed for committing new record (i.e., log). In case of single leader systems, you have to make sure that information has been replicated (the replication factor can be, for instance, 51%>).
As for PA properties: although we won't spend extra time on leader election, we still have a risk to reach the inconsistent state. The inconsistent state can be reached thanks to eventual consistency pattern, where each committed record can be applied to a certain node in non-direct order.
Timing
The problem with timing is completely based on the physical factor (hardware, network latency, and so on). This issue states that each member can receive updates in a different order and at a different speed. To manipulate this process, two models of possible interactions have been discovered: sync systems model and async system model.
The sync system model use timers (or any other physical criteria) for synchronization purpose: ping intervals, low/upper bound for accepting certain packet and so on. From the first point of view, the system seems to be reliable and efficient, as you bind your system to some physical factor (like max delay between voting). However, the backside of such approach is that you can receive huge delays in case of wrong tuning timers (besides the fact, that your system's performance will depend from physical factor, neither than from real performance of your hardware).
The async system model doesn't use timers, i.e. any time-bound, and as a result -the process of appending logs/voting and so on happen at an independent rate. The backside of such solution is synchronization between nodes: as hardware may vary, we can't guarantee, that logs appending will be under the same rate, and in this case, the weakest node will always be behind the real RSM state. Also, you have to handle the delays on your own (for instance, when you send log, and the follower don't respond about it) and take care of network failures.
Performance
This metric depends on the factors stated above (timing, scale factor, CAP properties). In order to better understand what kind of system we need, we have to look at the The first case, when we measure the system by log append speed, we will benchmark the speed of protocol, responsible for transmitting changes, and size of data. For instance, RAFT claims, that all requests should be performed from leader node, which means, that speed of logs delivery process depends from leader node's ability to process a certain amount of logs per second. While, in some PA based systems, each node can propose a change, which means that speed will be significantly higher.
The second case, when we measure the time, the required system became fully consistent, is the most common benchmark for PC systems. In the case of PC systems, the consistency and speed of appending changes to state is completely delegated to the leader. In terms of PC -we definitely will achieve lower time bound for achieving the state consistency.
Strong consistency models
The strong consistency models can be divided into two groups: linearizable and sequential consistency.
Linearizable:
This model state, that each log has its timestamp (when it was created), and leader node, have to apply these logs in the same order as the timestamp. The issue in this method is that some of the logs may be failed to deliver in time, and in this way, the leader will have to roll back the state and reappend some of the logs, including missed. (introduced by Herlihy & Wing, 1991) Sequential: This model state that operations should process in the same order, as they were received.
(introduced by Lamport, 1979) By the models presented above, we state that strong consistency is about RSM state, but not about the result of receiving/accepting the logs. This makes sense, as in the case of zero-collision cases, we are still able to achieve strong consistency even without strong leadership (i.e., with a single leader). But this condition will be truthful until we will satisfy the following condition: x(t) + y(t) = y(t) + x(t).
Security
Compromising network
In consensus systems, most attacks are closely connected with an ability to rewrite the state of nodes. This kind of attacks may vary and even be specific to RSM implementation. Below are listed the possible cases, applied to Mokka: 1) 51% attack: this is an attack when most peers in the network become malicious. However, in Mokka, this attack may be successful only in case the attacker got access not only to nodes but also to their private keys. Otherwise, even if the attacker will be able to send packets from these nodes, the attack won't pass as other peers use proof for validation of every change in RSM. 2) Byzantine failure: happens when a certain node has been replaced with a malicious one.
However, any action of this node will be ignored by other nodes, as all actions should be signed by the certain node (which propose change to state machine).
3) Freeze network: this kind of attack assumes that current leader has been replaced by another malicious node during active round. The main idea is to obtain the node's proof and use it alongside with ACK messages (which will inform followers that active leader is alive). In this way, the new fake leader won't be able to propose any change to the state machine but will keep the network from running new vote round and leader change. In order to overcome it, the nodes should have low latency, and replace of node with malicious one + sending ack packet should be less than heartbeat timeout. The other solution is to set the expiration time for generated proof token. This approach will force the network to revote, once this token becomes invalid.
